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Abstract
Investors who want to profitably trade stocks which they believe to be undervalued or overval-
ued are facing not just transaction costs: also cash constraints and short-selling restriction can
hinder them. Intuitively, the more onerous friction may seem to be short-selling: borrowing
shares from someone else and selling them looks more of a hassle than borrowing money or
using an overdraft facility. By examining the observed forward premiums in the Brussels Stock
Exchange during the period 1989-1996, this study aims at uncovering which of the two types
of restrictions had the biggest impact on trading: how often was shortselling the dominant
problem, what was the implied shadow cost of the imperfection, and how persistent were the
symptoms?
We show theoretically that a positive forward premium is more likely in a situation in
which the order volume from cash-constrained buyers exceeds that of sellers without a long
position. Likewise, a negative forward premium typically means that the order volume from
sellers without long positions exceeds that of cash-constrained buyers. We find empirically
that abnormally high forward premiums are 2.5-3 times more frequent and larger than negative
premiums, and that they persist in time, unlike negative premiums. Thus, contrary to what
many academics may have expected, in the Brussels environment getting money loans seems
to be a more frequent, more expensive, and more persistent problem than asset borrowing.
JEL G14, G15
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Introduction
Investors who want to profitably trade stocks which they believe to be undervalued or overval-
ued are facing not just transaction costs, but potentially also cash constraints and short-selling
restrictions. Intuitively, the more onerous of the latter two impediments may seem to be the
one on short-selling: borrowing shares from someone else and selling them looks more of a has-
sle than borrowing money or using an overdraft facility. By examining the observed forward
premiums in the Brussels Stock Exchange during the period 1989-1996, this study aims at
uncovering which of the two types of restrictions had the biggest impact on trading: how often
was shortselling the dominant problem, what was the implied shadow cost of the imperfection,
and how persistent were the symptoms? This information can be obtained by exploiting a
probably unique feature of the (then) Brussels market: until 1996, the Stock Exchange had
two parallel trading tiers: a “spot” market tier with third-day delivery where all stocks were
traded and, for the most active stocks, also a parallel “forward” tier with fixed-date delivery.
The forward market was cheaper, deeper, unhampered by price limits, and fully computerized.
More fundamentally, for us, it was the more convenient avenue for short sales and leveraged
purchases.
In this paper we study the opening prices from the angle of what drives the observed
forward premiums. The hypothesis that academics would first reach for is that the difference
reflects pure time value. In our data, this effect is absolutely minute relative to the noise.1
Anomalously, though, we find that abnormal forward premiums are strongly autocorrelated,
implying that there are predictable price differences. We argue that, in imperfect markets,
expected prices could indeed deviate by more than what transaction costs would suggest. One
possible reason for excessive deviations is that potential buyers may be strapped for cash, in
which case the automatic leverage implicit in a forward purchase would justify an extra forward
premium over and above pure time value. Similarly, regular cash short sales were virtually
impossible: there was no legal framework until the early 1990s, and the only option was to
actually borrow shares first. Information-driven sellers that want to avoid the hassle and delay
from a cash short sale would, for that reason, prefer selling forward instead and potentially
trade at forward prices that are abnormally low relative to the time-value-adjusted spot price.
1The noise stems from the fact that standard spot-forward arbitrage was impossible. The reason is that both
segments were order-driven, not quote-driven, and their opening prices were set via a call; so there were no firm
bids and asks, implying that the usual no-arbitrage predictions about price differences should be weakened into
statements about expectations.
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In sum, the key idea in this paper is that, in imperfect order-driven markets, price differences
could be primarily driven by convenience of financing or shortselling rather than by time value
and the traditional type of transaction costs.
By looking at the frequency, size, and persistence of abnormally high v abnormally low price
discrepancies we obtain clues as to which advantage the forward traders typically seek: the
convenience of easy asset borrowing (as signalled by excessively low relative forward prices) or
of automatic financing (indicated by high forward prices). We find that for virtually all stocks
(i) the probability of positive forward premium is much higher than that of negative premium;
(ii) the mean of positive premiums is higher than that of negative premiums in absolute terms;
and (iii) autocorrelation of forward premiums given positive premiums is significantly positive
and around twice as large as that of the negative premium. Thus, contrary to what many
academics may have expected, getting money loans seems to be a more frequent and more
pressing consideration than asset borrowing.
@@Our finding relates the literature on the possible impacts of ‘funding liquidity’ on prices
and market liquidity, eg Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001),
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2005), Coughenour and Saad (2004), Comerton-Forde,
Hendershott, Jones, Moulton and Seasholes (2008), Grossman and Vila (1992), and Liu and
Longstaff (2004). In this paper, we found that funding liquidity has an impact on forward
premiums.@@
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the markets and the
data. In Section 2 we start from a standard noisy-price model and discuss some preleminary
evidence from autocorrelations tests and an event study. Section 3 provides more detailed
results and systematic significance tests for the phenomena observed in the event study. Section
4 concludes.
1 The Two-Tier Brussels Stock Exchange: Institutional Back-
ground
Brussels used to have not only its own stock market (the Brussels Stock Exchange (BSE),
integrated into Euronext since 2001), but even a two-tiered one: a “spot” market tier with
third-day delivery, and for the most active stocks a parallel “forward” tier with fixed-date
delivery. There used to be twenty-four fixed settlement dates per year, implying that the trad-
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ing periods typically lasted about two weeks, hence their name quinzaine, two-week period.2
Details about the market organization are crucial for our analysis. In this section, we describe
the price mechanisms in the forward and spot market and the delivery rules as they applied
during the sample period.
1.1 The price mechanism in the forward tier
The forward market used to work via a pure public limit order book (which, during the sample
period, was kept by a version of Toronto’s Computer-Aided Trading System, CATS). Thus,
although brokers were allowed to trade on their own account, they did not act as market
makers, and their main role on the floor was to pass on the orders from the public to the
exchange. At 9 p.m., the one-hour pre-market started, during which orders could be added
or withdrawn and CATS displayed a continuously updated preliminary market-clearing price.
Actual trading in the forward market started at 10 a.m., with a simultaneous call market for
all stocks. That is, at 10 a.m. limit orders were matched as far as possible, and executed.
For most stocks the opening represented a substantial part of the day’s turnover. After the
opening round, the interactive trading session or “continuous market” started (10:00-16:30).
Throughout the continuous-market session, the four best unfilled limit orders on the buying
and selling side were displayed on computer screens and could be taken up by any incoming new
order. Only brokers saw the screens: at the time of the sample, individual investors just heard
(or saw) the opening and close prices over the radio or on Teletext, at noon or in the afternoon.
Orders could also be matched directly, between brokers or in-house, provided that the price
was within the book’s bid-ask spread and the trade was reported immediately to the exchange.
Large trades, i.e. blocks of at least BEF 50m (EUR 1,250,000) could be crossed or traded
outside the BSE (often in London or Paris), but had also to be reported immediately. There
were no limits on consecutive forward price changes. Limit order and trade prices were rounded
according to a schedule shown in Table 1. Until the 1996 reform, the exchange’s minimum
margin requirement for a forward trade was 25 percent, but the BSE left the enforcement of
this rule to the individual brokers (who bore the default risk). Securities could be posted as
margin; in fact, many investors left most or all of their stocks with a their broker—most shares
2The forward market has now disappeared, following a “T ≤ t + 7 days” rule implemented internationally
in the 1990s. London used to have a two-weekly fixed-delivery system too: Paris had delivery at the end of the
month in its “forward” section for big stocks. (There also was a spot section for small stocks). Basel offered the
choice between several delivery dates.
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Table 1: Tick Size in the Spot and Forward Market
price must be minimal percentage price change
a multiple of at lower end at top end
price range of scale of scale
BEF 1-500 1 100% 0.20%
BEF 502-1,500 2 0.40% 0.13%
BEF 1,505-5,000 5 0.33% 0.10%
BEF 5,010-10,000 10 0.20% 0.10%
BEF 10,025-50,000 25 0.25% 0.05%
BEF 50,050 50 0.10% —
Key One BEF is approximately EUR 0.025.
are bearer securities—and used this portfolio as margin for forward positions. Thus, there was
no opportunity cost associated with the margin.
Prices for all traded lots were shown, in sequence (but not time-stamped), in the official
price list, a function later taken over by the financial dailies, De Tijd and L’Echo de la Bourse.
In the electronic records, only open/close/high/low are available.
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1.2 The Spot Price Mechanism
Due to its lower volume, the spot market was fully computerized much later (in 1996). Like
the forward tier, it was order-driven but the implementation was more artisanal. First, there
was no pre-market, so that the opening price was potentially much more subject to noise than
the forward opening price even apart from volume effects. Second, because of the thinness of
the market, for many stocks there was just one trading round per day; this subsegment of the
spot market was called the ‘parket/parquet ’ market. A continuous market existed only for the
more active stocks (quoted on the “corbeille” subsegment) and even this continuous market
was not very active.3 Third, there was no centralized public order book kept by the exchange.
Rather, a few specialist brokers each kept their own books, and met sometime between 1 p.m.
and 1.30 p.m. on the Exchange’s floor to aggregate their information and identify the price
that maximizes trade from the combined order book. Fourth, for stocks that were not traded
on the parallel forward market, there were daily price limits of 5 percent (for very thinly traded
stocks, traded on the parket segment) or 10 percent (for other stocks, traded on the “corbeille”
market). And, in the corbeille market, subsequent intraday price changes could not exceed 5
percent.
The actual pricing and trading was organized by a BSE official who started by crying out
a price proposal. This price proposal equaled the price that maximized trade from the order
book if that price was within the price change limits. If not, the official announced the price
limit itself. In addition to the price proposal, the official also announced the direction of the
imbalance. If there was an excess supply (demand) at the proposed price, additional purchase
(sale) orders from the floor were solicited to reduce the imbalance in the book. If the remaining
imbalance between supply and demand at the price limit was less than 50 percent, the specialist
would decide to ‘reduce’ most or all orders on the excess side, i.e. execute only part of each
order. The transaction price was then published in the financial press with the qualification
“sellers reduced” or “buyers reduced”. If, at the price limit, the imbalance between supply
and demand remained huge, even after soliciting orders from the floor, there was no trade at
all and the price limit was published as an indicative price. In practice, however, when the
imbalance was only slightly larger than 50 percent, the stock’s specialist brokers often added
purchase or sale orders for their own account to prevent no-trade (and no-income) days.
3Corbeille, meaning ‘basket’, refers to the tables with an unusual basket-like basis that were in that part of
the floor. Parquet refers to the wooden floor covering.
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As, around 1990, the spot market list contained about 300 stocks, the stock-by-stock
opening-call prices were set more or less sequentially. The exact timing of each stock’s spot
fixing was not registered.
As mentioned, the spot market had two sub-tiers. For about half the stocks, those listed
on the parket market with its less liquid stocks, the call was also the only price for that day.
For stocks quoted on the corbeille, the fixing was followed by the traditional (blackboard-and-
chalk) version of the continuous market: unfilled orders were chalked onto the blackboard and
could be picked up from the floor, and orders could also be matched directly on the floor at a
price within the book’s spread. For the corbeille market, prices for all traded lots were shown,
in sequence (but not time-stamped), in the official price list but in the electronic records, only
open/close/high/low are available. For the parket stocks there is just the single price.
1.3 Settlement Rules
For the BSE, the other details of the actual settlement were similar for both market tiers. The
buyer paid via a bank transfer rather than by check. This means that there was no “mail
float” on the payment side. Still, the value dates for buyer and seller did not match perfectly:
the buyer’s value date is one day before the actual settlement day and the seller obtains value
one day after settlement.
Delivery of the stock could mean actual physical delivery of the piece of paper, if the
buyer desired so. Alternatively, the buyer could ask that his or her purchase be recorded
with a netting and depository institution, the Caisse Interprofessionelle/Interprofessionele
Kas (CIK). The CIK merely netted the physical deliveries across brokers if actual delivery is
asked and held the paper on behalf of investors who did not demand physical delivery. Thus,
the CIK was not a clearing house in the usual sense: it did not act as a central counterpart, nor
did it cancel an individual investor’s earlier purchases against subsequent sales (or vice versa)
within one settlement period. There was some informal clearing by brokers, though: brokers
did not exact delivery and payment for a forward transaction that was reversed later on via
the same brokerage house and within the same quinzaine.
One function of the forward market, therefore, was to reduce the cost and hassle of mutually
offsetting stock deliveries and payments for trades that had been closed out within the same
quinzaine. This partly explains why, unlike in currency markets, the transaction costs for small
trades in the forward tier were somewhat lower than in the spot tier (as illustrated in Table
Spot-Forward Price Gaps: the Value of Convenience in the Brussels SE 7
Table 2: Transaction costs, spot and forward, 1990
cost of cost of
item spot trades forward trades
+) BSE Commission max(tradesize×0.03%, BEF 6 000)†
+) Transaction Tax max(tradesize×0.17%, BEF 10 000)
+) Brokerage fees:
- fixed part BEF 200∗
- variable part:
order BEF 1-5m 1% .8%
order BEF 5m-10m .8% .6%
order BEF 10m-20m .4% .3%
order BEF 20m-30m ≥ BEF 130 000‡ .2%
order ≥ BEF 30m ≥ BEF 130 000‡ ≥ BEF 120 000‡
† : 40 BEF is worth approx. 1 EUR; * : plus BEF 100 for the buyer if physical delivery is asked; ‡ : negotiable,
with the stated amounts as minima. Thus, around 1990 a rather small trade of BEF 250,000 (approx. EUR 6.250)
would cost 1.29 percent spot, and 1.09 percent forward. For an order of BEF 30m (750,000 Euros), the cost
difference may be as small as 10,000/30,000,000 = .033 percent.
2).4 A second useful feature of the forward tier is that it allows one to take short positions
until the end of the quinzaine, positions that could then be rolled over fairly easily. In Belgium,
there was no formal legal framework for asset borrowing and spot short-selling until the 1991
Financial Market Reform Act, and even then the only organized facility was the opening by the
central bank of a lending facility for Government bonds, accessible to the prime brokers who
distribute and quote the bonds. For stocks, shorting in the cash market meant (and means)
finding one’s own asset lender; even nowadays, prime brokers might only be willing to help for
big orders in big stocks. In short, the forward market provided the sole organized opportunity
for short positions.5 A third function of the forward market was to provide the equivalent of
buying on margin: the actual payment was deferred until the end of the quinzaine (at which
moment the forward contract could be rolled over) and the buyer just posted the 25 percent
security. Since leveraged buying was possible in the forward market, no organized system of
buying on margin was set up in the spot market.
4Another reason for the lower transaction costs might have been the fact that the forward market had vastly
larger volumes than the spot market for the same stock, see below.
5There was even a centralized mechanism for asset lending in the forward market if, at the end of the quinzaine
one wanted to roll over a short position. The solution was to borrow a stock (for delivery under the maturing
contract), and to buy it back for the new forward date. Finding a lender happened in an organized session on
the day of the prolongations. The agents settles his gain or loss, the difference of the initially contracted price
and the settlement price at 1:30 p.m. on the last day of the quinzaine, and also pays the time value until the
next settlement day. In return he holds a new contract at the settlement price.
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1.4 Possible clientele and differential information aspects
It is fair to say that the organization of the forward markets was superior: it was fully com-
puterized, and therefore faster, already by the late 80s; had a pre-market that revealed the
market consensus and reduced the impact of accidental imbalances that would otherwise have
plagued the opening call; enjoyed lower costs and no price limits; and was much deeper. Figure
1 reports the eight-year mean of the volume ratio, forward to spot, for each stock. Note that
the 71 selected stocks are ranked from low to high ratio. We see ratios going from 2.5 to 250;
more fairly perhaps, when stocks are put into three relative-volume buckets, each of 24 stocks,
the average relative volume per bucket goes from about 10 to 50.
In addition (or, perhaps, as a result of the above), conventional wisdom within the financial
community held that there also was an clientele- and efficiency-related form of segmentation.6
Indeed, because of its shorting facilities and the absence of price limits, the forward market
had a somewhat more speculative reputation, to the extent that conservative firms (such as
the major banks) have long resisted a forward listing. Because of this speculative image, the
forward market was considered to be the market for the more professional agents, while less
sophisticated investors were said to prefer the spot market. Having no systematic and fast
access to news during working hours, these amateur traders allegedly reacted slower than the
professionals. In the terminology of Garbade and Silber (1983), this view hypothesizes that the
forward market was the price discoverer, while the spot market was just a (lagging) satellite
market. This hypothesis is the central issue of the dissertation.
We conclude the descriptive section with some information on the data.
1.5 Data Description
The sample period starts in early 1989, at which time the forward market was fully computer-
ized, and it ends in 1996. In 1997, the forward market disappeared. Euronext’s historic-data
CDs for that period include the opening spot price per day, and, for the forward market, the
daily opening, high and low, and close price. Data on dividends, bonus dividends, splits, and
rights issues7 were missing, and were hand-collected from Memento der Effecten, a trade pub-
6We are indebted to the late Prof. Van Essche for this suggestion.
7A subscription right is represented by a coupon designated for the purpose and it is traded separately the
moment the stock goes ex this coupon. The market values of these “scripts” are very noisy so we worked with
Spot-Forward Price Gaps: the Value of Convenience in the Brussels SE 9
Figure 1: Mean of Volume Ratio, Forward to Spot
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lication, and from De Tijd, which published the Dutch-language version of the Official Price
List. For the risk-free rate, we used the Euro-BEF 1 week middle rate from Datastream.
We discarded foreign stocks, about half of the list, since price discovery for these shares
probably happens abroad anyway. So we started from data on 119 Belgian stocks traded on
both the spot and forward tiers of the Brussels Stock Exchange during the period 1989-1996.
Some data cleaning was required: 16 stocks are excluded due to an insufficient number of
observations (too many missing data points), 31 stocks are connected to other shares due to
a change in the name or code after a stock split or merger. Thus, 72 stocks remain. All
unusually large forward premiums or large changes in the prices were double-checked with the
prices posted on the hard copies of De Tijd, including the next-day rectifications for typos. All
prices that are indicated ‘sellers reduced’, ‘buyers reduced’, or ‘indicative’, were considered to
be missing observations. Whenever there is a missing price, the two returns that are associated
with that price are missing too. That is, we never use cumulated returns straddling some
missing price.
As the risk-free rate we used the one-week call-money rate and the [calendar days]/360
time convention that then applied outside the interbank market for bef.
We mainly use the opening prices for our empirical analysis. We would have liked to work
the standard instrinsic value of a subscription right.
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Table 3: Trading Frequency and One-day Return Variance across Turnover Classes
sample Number of Returns Average Variance Median Variance
(by turnover) Spot Forward Spot Forward Spot Forward
All 95,668 87,957 3.26 3.43 2.23 1.91
Low turnover 27,605 21,772 4.55 5.17 2.77 2.11
Medium turnover 31,192 29,324 3.23 3.12 1.92 1.66
High turnover 36,871 36,861 1.99 2.00 1.61 1.88
Key: Each turnover class contains 24 stocks, and ranking is done on the basis of average daily turnover.
with the close prices too, but for unknown reasons, close prices are missing quite often. Eight
years of data means over 2000 trading days. The number of effectively available observations
is very variable, ranging from below 50% to 100%. There is a clear relation with the market
activity. As can be seen in Table 3, the firms in low-, medium-, and high-turnover groups
on average trade 55, 62, and 74 percent of the time, respectively, in the spot market. In the
forward market, the corresponding numbers are 43, 58, and 74 percent. Forward markets more
often have missing prices than spot markets despite their higher turnovers and the absence of
price limits. This probably reflects the interventions by the spot market’s specialists mentioned
in Section 1.2. There is also a strong negative relation between turnover and return variance,
prima facie, as also illustrated via Figure 2. Much of that, however, seems to be due to the
outliers: when we consider medians, the schedule is much flatter.
By way of caveat, note that the variances in the text table offer just a rough first picture. It
ignores, for instance, the fact that the spot market was active on more days than the forward
tier, and that days where the forward market did not manage to reach equilibrium may also
have been unusually illiquid and noisy days in the spot market.
2 Momentum in Forward Premiums
In order to investigate the behavior of the spot-forward price discrepancies, we first look at
the autocorrelation of the forward premiums and find strong, pervasive momentum. Further-
more, an event study reveals that the autocorrelations of forward premiums seem to be very
different depending on their sign, and that such an sign-related asymmetry actually holds for
the frequencies and average absolute sizes of the premiums too (subsection 1).
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Figure 2: Variances of daily returns, spot v forward; opening prices, all days
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2.1 Characterisation of prices in a noisy-markets setting
Let vt denote an unobservable true value based on full and correct use of all relevant available
information, expressed as a price for immediate payment and delivery. Since neither the actual
spot nor forward prices imply immediate settlement, the corresponding true “spot” and forward
values, denoted as s and f , should contain a settlement effect shown below, with ns and nf
denoting the number of calendar days to settlement and R the simple per diem interest rate. In
addition, actually observed prices are assumed to deviate from true values by a zero-mean, i.i.d.
noise term, denoted by s or f , respectively, which reflects unanticipated orders by liquidity
traders and noise traders, as standard in microstructure models:8
noise-free prices: st+τ = (1 + ns,tRt)vt+τ , (1)
ft = (1 + nf,tRt)vt, (2)
observed prices: St+τ = st+τ (1 + s,t+τ ) = vt+τ (1 + ns,tRt)(1 + s,t+τ ), (3)
Ft = ft(1 + f,t) = vt(1 + nf,tRt)(1 + f,t). (4)
8Liquidity traders place orders to park excess cash balances or solve cash shortages; they do so at the market
price without questioning its appropriateness. Noise traders act on false beliefs or rumors. Either type of
trade could drive prices away from the true value. Informed traders do perceive the true value (or a good
approximation to it), and by their trades reduce the gap between true and quoted values. Still, such corrective
action is either instantaneous nor costless.
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Figure 3: Asynchronism of Spot vs Forward Prices
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Key: t is at 10 a.m. and t+ τ is at 1:30 p.m.
with Et−4(s,t+τ ) = 0 = Et−4(f,t) for any positive 4; time t refers to 10 a.m., the opening of
the forward market; and time t + τ refers to approximate 1:30 p.m., the opening time of the
spot market.
From these models, the forward premium, ln(F/S), is obtained by subtracting the two
log-price equations, the logs of (3) and (4):
pt =: ln
(
Ft
St+τ
)
= ln
(
1 + nf,tRt
1 + ns,tRt
)
+ ln
(
vt
vt+τ
)
+ ef,t − es,t+τ ,
=: ∆(nfsR)t − ρmt+1 + ef,t − es,t (5)
where r is the observed return (or percentage price change, including any coupon detached
between t− 1 and t); ∆(nR)t is the theoretical settlement effect in the left-hand-side variable,
i.e. ln[(1 +nf,tRt)/(1 +ns,tRt); ρmt is the true return in the morning (10 a.m.—1:30 p.m.); and
et the percentage noise added in the time-t price. In short, because of the asynchrony there
still is a signal in the data, but relative to daily returns in microstructure studies our data
reflect less true value changes relatively to noise.
2.2 Autocorrelation in the forward premiums
In order to investigate the behavior of the forward premiums, we purge the settlement effect
from the data and work with the settlement-corrected forward prices and premiums, denoted
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as ones with primes, as follows:
F ′t := Ft
1 + ns,tRt
1 + nf,tRt
, (6)
p′t := ln
F ′t
St+τ
, (7)
= −ρmt+1 + ef,t − es,t+τ . (8)
In this section, whenever we use the words forward price and forward premium, these should
always be understood to be time-value-adjusted.
In integrated and frictionless markets, the expected synchronous prices that emerge from
the opening calls should be identical:
Et−4(St) = Et−4(F ′t), (9)
for any positive 4. From this it follows that realized forward premiums should be unpre-
dictable, implying, for instance, zero autocorrelation in the realized premiums. While the
forward premium is theoretically the difference of the pricing errors in the synchronous case,
when the prices are asynchronous the premiums involve the additional morning true return
term ρmt+1 as shown in (8). Therefore, a non-zero mean or autocorrelation of the realized pre-
miums could come from either the morning true return, or the pricing errors, or both. In the
remaining part of this subsection, we investigate the autocorrelation of the premiums and its
possible sources. We shall see that the results are such that they cannot soley or even largely
come from the morning-return term. In the final section, when examining the implication of
the mean forward premiums, we even ignore the expected morning true return because of its
trivial magnitude.
Figure 4 summarizes the estimated autocorrelations of the forward premiums for the indi-
vidual stocks visually, while Table 4 provides some numerical information. In the graph we plot
the 72 coefficients for the stocks ranked by increasing turnover. The obvious conclusion is that
autocorrelation is positive: out of the total 72 cases, only one estimate actually is negative,
and only marginally at that, while 66 cases or 91.7% of the estimates are significantly positive.
Both the graph and the table show that the averages and the number of significant rejections
tend to fall the more active the stock is, but the effect is quite slight: the general average
coefficient is 0.27, falling from 0.32 to 0.24 as we go from thinly to actively-traded stocks; the
medians tell a similar tale. The aggregate estimates shown in the “panel estimation” part of
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Figure 4: Autocorrelation in the Forward Premiums, Stock by Stock.
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Key: Ex-post forward premiums for 72 stocks are regressed on their lagged value. This slope, ρ1, estimates the
scaled autocovariance of the forward premiums. A zero ρ1 means that forward premiums are not correlated, a
positive one signals positive autocorrelation in premiums, meaning that the true-morning-return is also auto-
correlated of first-order. We show estimated rhos and their p-values for all stocks, arranged by daily average
turnover. Estimates per stock are plotted for stocks ranged by turnover rate. For visibility, the dots are linked
by line segments, but any similarity to a time-series plot is unintended.
the table9 are very similar to the straightforward means of individual estimates, and are clearly
different from zero. All this again indicates that the forward premium is positively autocor-
related. Autocorrelation in the morning true returns could be a source of autocorrelation in
price discrepancies, but it is almost unthinkable, in an efficient market, that the true returns
could generate daily autocorrelation of 0.3.10 So, the results imply that the noise part in the
forward premiums are predictable, which is a sign of inefficiency or at least a reflection of an
imperfection. The phenomenon occurs across the entire spectrum of trading volume.
2.3 Event study
To see whether autocorrelation is pervasive, or confined to, for instance, rare extreme outliers,
we add an event study. Table 5 shows average abnormal forward premiums in the period of 1
to 10 days after an ‘event’, with the event being defined as a forward premium falling in the
9Average or aggregate values can be obtained by running panel regressions with a common slope, as long as
deviations from the common slope are independent. For aggregates obtained via panel regression we test the
independence assumption by regressing, for every equation, the 72 slopes on the corresponding turnovers. For
the sample as a whole there is, unsurprisingly, a significant negative relation, but within turnover groups there
is no more clear link (Table 10 in the appendix).
10Also, we see no such high autocorrelation in either spot or forward daily returns.
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Table 4: Test of Autocorrelation in the Forward Premiums.
Et−∆
(
F ′t−St
St−1
|St−1, F ′t−1
)
= ρ0 + ρ1
F ′t−1−St−1
St−1
sample individual series estimation panel estimation
(by turnover) mean median n>0 sgnf>0 sgnf<0 ρˆ1 SE(.) t-stat prob
All 0.27 0.26 71 68 0 0.29 0.011 25.33 0.0000
Low turnover 0.32 0.32 24 23 0 0.32 0.022 14.30 0.0000
Medium 0.26 0.26 23 22 0 0.27 0.016 17.08 0.0000
High 0.24 0.20 24 23 0 0.26 0.012 21.50 0.0000
Key: Ex-post forward premiums for 72 stocks are regressed on their lagged value. A zero ρ means that forward
premiums are not correlated, a positive one signals positive autocorrelation in premiums, meaning positive
autocorrelation in the true-morning return. We show summary statistics for all stocks and for three subsamples
of stocks arranged by daily average turnover.
interval 2 to 3%, 3 to 4%, and larger than 4%, respectively, and similarly for negative premiums.
The result is that, after negative mispricing irrespectively of the size, the next-day abnormal
premium was close to zero. The result for positive premiums is different: conditional on an
unusually high initial forward premium, it takes several days for the abnormal premium to
decay towards zero. Typically, one-third of a large positive premium is still there the next day,
against about one-tenth for negative outliers. The phenomenon of conditional autocorrelation
is most pronounced with the less active stocks. An additional striking fact is that positive
extreme events are at least 2.5 times more frequent than negative ones. In the next section we
provide a framework that can explain these phenomenons.
3 Forward Premiums in the Presence of Financing and Short-
ing Costs
From the above, there seems to be something else going on rather than just ex ante arbitraging,
i.e. selecting the market that is likely to offer the best opening price. Standard transaction costs
may affect the choice between the tiers, but the differences are small, as we saw. Moreover, if
standard transaction costs were the main imperfection in the market, there would never be any
spot trades since their cost is higher; so there must be something else. Other imperfections
that come to mind are costs of shorting—the hassle and delay and commission paid when
finding a party that lends shares or provides money. We denote these costs, or their monetary
equivalent for individual i, by Cis (borrowing Shares) or C
i
m (borrowing Money), respectively.
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Table 5: Average Abnormal Forward Premiums: Event Study
positive events
∈ [2%, 3%) # of day 0 day 1 day 2 day 3 day 4 day 5 day 6 day 7 day 8 day 9 day 10
events (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
All 4099 2.38 0.95 0.75 0.66 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.52
Low turnover 1823 2.42 1.21 1.02 0.93 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.58 0.59 0.64 0.58
Medium 1317 2.38 0.83 0.68 0.57 0.45 0.51 0.51 0.45 0.53 0.49 0.62
High 959 2.35 0.80 0.56 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.48 0.43 0.37 0.32 0.36
∈ [3%, 4%) # of day 0 day 1 day 2 day 3 day 4 day 5 day 6 day 7 day 8 day 9 day 10
events (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
All 1485 3.42 1.20 0.81 0.63 0.66 0.73 0.57 0.50 0.58 0.52 0.52
Low turnover 765 3.45 1.51 1.00 0.92 0.83 0.98 0.80 0.82 0.78 0.73 0.70
Medium 418 3.39 1.43 0.87 0.58 0.76 0.90 0.51 0.38 0.64 0.53 0.41
High 302 3.42 0.70 0.55 0.39 0.39 0.32 0.38 0.27 0.31 0.30 0.43
≥4% # of day 0 day 1 day 2 day 3 day 4 day 5 day 6 day 7 day 8 day 9 day 10
events (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
All 1309 5.33 1.36 1.01 0.77 0.80 0.72 0.64 0.62 0.67 0.66 0.66
Low turnover 804 5.51 2.19 1.53 1.27 1.21 1.10 0.99 0.82 1.03 0.95 1.01
Medium 373 5.32 1.32 0.94 0.73 0.67 0.68 0.43 0.60 0.54 0.38 0.50
High 132 5.14 0.53 0.52 0.27 0.46 0.35 0.49 0.42 0.40 0.64 0.45
negative events
∈ (−3%,−2%] # of day 0 day 1 day 2 day 3 day 4 day 5 day 6 day 7 day 8 day 9 day 10
events (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
All 1685 -2.41 -0.17 0.06 0.17 0.31 0.18 0.30 0.24 0.16 0.26 0.23
Low turnover 568 -2.43 -0.22 0.11 0.34 0.49 0.42 0.47 0.27 0.42 0.36 0.37
Medium 621 -2.41 -0.16 0.15 0.18 0.36 0.11 0.20 0.23 0.01 0.26 0.25
High 496 -2.40 -0.15 -0.07 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.23 0.21 0.05 0.18 0.07
∈ (−4%,−3%] # of day 0 day 1 day 2 day 3 day 4 day 5 day 6 day 7 day 8 day 9 day 10
events (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
All 593 -3.41 -0.41 -0.04 0.08 0.14 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.20 0.19 0.24
Low turnover 208 -3.42 -0.51 0.00 0.09 0.33 0.16 0.11 0.10 0.57 0.49 0.43
Medium 273 -3.38 -0.37 0.16 0.10 0.17 0.23 -0.19 0.00 -0.10 0.21 0.17
High 112 -3.44 -0.35 -0.29 0.05 -0.12 -0.21 0.06 0.14 0.09 -0.19 0.10
≤-4% # of day 0 day 1 day 2 day 3 day 4 day 5 day 6 day 7 day 8 day 9 day 10
events (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
All 500 -5.20 -0.43 -0.12 0.25 -0.07 0.30 0.35 0.23 0.16 0.17 0.26
Low turnover 224 -5.29 -0.64 -0.31 0.46 -0.27 0.60 0.28 0.33 0.31 0.12 0.65
Medium 217 -5.25 -0.36 0.06 0.09 -0.14 0.11 0.60 0.13 0.08 0.25 0.14
High 59 -5.03 -0.22 -0.09 0.16 0.26 0.10 0.13 0.23 0.04 0.14 -0.09
Key: We show the average realized forward premium on days 1, ... 10 following an event, the event being
defined as a forward premium (shown in the column for day 0) between 2 and 3%, or between 3 and 4%, or
exceeding 4%, and similarly for the negative side. We expect a zero mean, in well-integrated and well-functioning
markets. ‘All’ refers to all stocks. ‘Low’, ‘Medium’ and ‘High’ refer to subsamples of 24 stocks each, assembled
on the basis of average daily turnover.
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Table 6: Conditions for trading forward instead of spot
type of trade (condition on F ′) (condition on F ′ − S)
buy, no constraint F ′ ≤ S F ′ − S ≤ 0
buy, cash constrained F ′ ≤ S + Cm F ′ − S ≤ Cm
buy to close an initial short position F ′ ≤ S − Cs F ′ − S ≤ −Cs
sell, no constraint F ′ ≥ S F ′ − S ≥ 0
sell, cash constrained F ′ − Cm ≤ S F ′ − S ≥ Cm
sell, no long position F ′ ≥ S +−Cs F ′ − S ≥ −Cs
3.1 The effect of funding and shorting costs: testable hypotheses
Suppose, initially, that we have a quote-driven market with zero spreads and that the costs
are either zero (for buyers with cash, or sellers with a long position) or assume the same value,
i.e. Cm for all individuals facing liquidity problems and Cs for all sellers that have no long
position. We distinguish six types of trades, three of them buyers and three sellers. In the case
of buying, liquidity traders may include some agents who need to deliver shares because of an
earlier short sale. They could buy spot at a price S or buy forward and borrow shares at a cost
F ′ +Cs; therefore, such buyers would buy forward if the spot price is higher than the forward
price plus the cost Cs. Regular liquidity traders, as well as informed or speculative buyers that
face no cash constraint, would simply compare both prices. Lastly, informed or speculative
buyers who are short of cash compare F ′ with the cost of a levered spot deal, S + Cm.
In the case of selling, similar results hold. Liquidity traders would sell forward and get a
loan if the forward price minus the cost of borrowing exceeds the spot price. Information or
speculative sellers, in contrast would sell forward if the forward price is above the spot price
minus, if relevant, the cost of borrowing shares, Cs. In Table 6 we show for each of these six
relevant potential clienteles the condition on forward premium that would steer the deal to the
forward market.
These six conditions are visualized in Figure 5, with each time a half-line indicating the
range of forward premiums that would direct these trades towards the forward market. (The
costs Cm and Cs are shown as equally large, but this is just for illustrative purposes.) Un-
surprisingly, there is a potential match of supply and demand in the whole range [−Cs, Cm],
instead of the standard perfect-markets solution F ′−S = 0. We see that liquidity-driven sellers
should find no counterparts save, at the margin, cash-constrained buyers; most liquidity-driven
sales should therefore be done spot. So if we see a positive forward premium, this means that
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Figure 5: Ranges of acceptable forward premiums for various clienteles
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the order volume from cash-constrained buyers exceeds that of sellers without a long position
unless, implausibly, there is not a single seller who actually holds the stock, initially. Likewise,
if we observe a negative forward premium, the order volume from sellers without long posi-
tions should exceed that of cash-constrained buyers except on unlikely days with absolutely
no buyers who do have enough cash at hand.
In the above, we assumed firm quotes. If we have an order-driven market instead, the
analysis still works for limit orders, provided the probability of execution is similar across
segments. For market orders, the numbers F ′ and S have to be interpreted as expected opening
prices. Realized prices would always differ from expectations, but in a purely random way; so
if we see mostly positive forward premiums, this would still means that, on a modal day, the
order volume from cash-constrained buyers exceeds that of sellers without a long position.11
In light of all this, we look at the forward premiums as follows:
1. The frequencies of realized premiums F ′ − S grouped per sign provide an indication
of which clientele is most often the active marginal group in the forward market, with
positive premiums suggesting an ascendency of liquidity-constrained buyers and vice
versa.
From the frequencies per se we do not know whether a higher incidence of, say, forward
premiums reflects higher financing costs relative to shorting costs: it might equally well
mean that noise traders tend to be bearish more often than bullish. But if we would
observe that premiums are not only more frequent but also larger in absolute terms than
11The analysis does not provide a unique value of F ′ − S; for this, one would have to assume heterogeneity
in the costs and/or in the expected opening prices S and F ′, so that the supply and demand schedules would
be less stepwise than what we have here. For current purposes, we do not need that refinement.
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discounts, there is a positive implication for costs:
2. The mean values of absolute realized premiums F ′−S per sign are bounded by the costs
Cm or Cs, so they provide an indication of the size of the shorting and borrowing cost.
For instance, if positive premiums are typically larger, i.e. if buyers are prepared to pay
a relatively big premium for a forward solution, this suggest that the cost of getting a
loan exceeds the cost of shorting a share.
3. The persistence of the premiums per sign provides an indication about the persistence of
particular clientele effects. For example, if speculative or informed purchases from cash-
constrained come in waves that last more than a day, positive premiums would tend to
persist. Persistence then strongly suggests that the effect is due to such a wave of clientele
trades rather than to unexpected forward premiums reflecting random imbalances in the
order book.
In short, we want to explore the findings suggested by the event study in a more systematic
fashion, including significance tests.
3.2 Frequency Test
In order to examine the probability of positive v.s negative forward premiums, we run the
following regression:
SIGN − 0.5 = α1 + β1[SIGN(−1)− SIGN(−1)]. (10)
where x(−1) refers to x lagged and x to the time-series average of x; SIGN = 1 if the forward
premium is positive, and SIGN = 0 otherwise.
Let f− and f+ denote the probability of positive and negative forward premiums, respec-
tively. The coefficient α1 in equation (10) provides an estimate of (f+− 0.5). If α1 is positive,
then f+ > 0.5 and f− < 0.5, meaning that the forward premiums are positive with higher
probability. The regression equation includes the lag of the SIGN variable to control for the
autocorrelation of the error terms in the significance test. Figure 6 and Table 7 report the
result of the test for the significance of the α1 estimate, in which the Newey-West standard
errors are used.
The obvious feature is that the α1 estimates are significantly positive for almost all stocks.
Out of the total 72 cases, the estimates are positive 67 times, i.e. in 93% of the cases, and
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Figure 6: Frequency Test
SIGN − 0.5 = α1 + β1(SIGN(−1)− SIGN(−1))
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Key: In the frequency test equation, SIGN = 1 if the forward premium is positive, and SIGN = 0 otherwise. If
α1 is positive, then the probability of positive forward premiums is higher than 0.5, i.e f
+ > 0.5 and f− < 0.5,
meaning that the forward premiums are positive with higher probability.
Table 7: Frequency of Positive Premiums per Sign
Frequency test: SIGN − 0.5 = α1 + β1[SIGN(−1)− SIGN(−1)]
mean α1 median positive sgnf>0 negative sgnf<0
All 0.112 0.109 67 57 5 3
Low turnover 0.111 0.113 22 18 2 1
Medium 0.124 0.129 24 20 0 0
High 0.101 0.106 21 19 3 2
Key: In the frequency test equation, SIGN = 1 if the forward premium is positive, and SIGN = 0 otherwise. If
α1 is positive, then the probability of positive forward premiums is higher than 0.5, i.e f
+ > 0.5 and f− < 0.5,
meaning that the forward premiums are positive with higher probability.
in 57 of these 67 cases (79%) significantly so. This feature comes up similarly in all the three
subgroups: out of 24 cases in each of the low-, medium-, and high-market turnover groups,
the estimates are positive in 22 (92%), 24 (100%), and 21 (88%) cases, respectively, of which
18 (75%), 20 (83%), 19 (79%) are significantly so. This result means that f+ > 0.5—the
forward premium is positive more frequently—in the vast majority of the cases. The order
of magnitude seems to be over 60% positive against less than 40% negative price gaps. This
includes also the smaller price discrepancies; from the event study we remember that, for equal
absolute cut-off levels of 2% or more, there are 2.5 to 3 times more positive forward premiums.
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Table 8: Conditional Mean of Forward Premiums per Sign
| F
′−S
S(−1) | = α2(1− SIGN) + β2SIGN + γ2SIGN(−1) + δ| F
′−S
S(−1) |(−1)
α2 negpremiums β2 pospremiums (β2 − α2)
mean median mean median mean median n>0 sgnf>0 n<0 sgnf<0
All 0.006 0.005 0.009 0.008 0.0025 0.0026 70 47 2 0
Low turnover 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.011 0.0043 0.0035 24 17 0 0
Medium 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.0015 0.0025 23 15 1 0
High 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.0018 0.0018 23 15 1 0
Key: α2 and β2 estimate the mean of negative and positive forward premiums in absolute term, respectively.
The graph on the left shows α2 and β2 estimates for each stock. The one on the right shows the difference of
the means, (β2 − α2), and its t-statistics, in which the Newey-West standard error is used.
3.3 Conditional Mean of Forward Premium per Sign
In order to compare the shadow cost of getting a loan and the cost of shorting a share, we
compare the absolute realized premium F
′ − S per sign. To this end, we regress the following
equation:
|F
′ − S
S(−1) | = α2(1− SIGN) + β2SIGN + γ2SIGN(−1) + δ|
F
′ − S
S(−1) |(−1). (11)
where | F
′−S
S(−1) | is the absolute value of the percentage forward premiums; SIGN = 1 if the
forward premium is positive, and SIGN = 0 otherwise.
The coefficient α2 and β2 estimate the mean of negative and positive forward premiums in
absolute terms, respectively. If (β2−α2) is positive, the mean of positive premiums is higher the
mean of negative premiums. Equation (11) includes the lag of the variables SIGN and | F
′−S
S(−1) |
to control for the autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of the regression error terms. Figure
7 and Table 8 summarize the result. The general picture is that the estimates of (β2−α2) are
positive in almost all of the cases: 70 (97%), 24 (100%), 23 (96%), and 23 (96%) cases out of
the total 72 cases, and out of the 24 cases in each of the low-, medium-, and high-turnover
market sections, respectively. The estimates are significantly positive in 47 (65%), 17 (71%),
15 (63%) and 15 (63%) cases in the total group, and the low-, medium-, and high-turnover
groups, respectively. This result means that a positive premium was typically higher than a
negative premiums, in absolute terms, for almost each and every stock, suggesting that the
total cost of getting a loan exceeds the cost of shorting a share.
Spot-Forward Price Gaps: the Value of Convenience in the Brussels SE 22
Figure 7: Conditional Mean of Forward Premiums per Sign
| F
′−S
S(−1) | = α2(1− SIGN) + β2SIGN + γ2SIGN(−1) + δ| F
′−S
S(−1) |(−1)
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Key: α2 and β2 estimate the mean of negative and positive forward premiums in absolute term, respectively.
The graph on the left shows α2 and β2 estimates for each stock. The one on the right shows the difference
of the means, which is multiplied by 100 in the graph, i.e. 100 ∗ (β2 − α2), and its t-statistics, in which the
Newey-West standard error is used.
3.4 Autocorrelation per Sign
To examine the dependence of the forward-premium autocorrelation on the sign of forward
premiums, we regress the following equation:
F
′ − S = ρ0 + ρ−(F ′ − S)(−1) ∗ (1− SIGN(−1)) + ρ+(F ′ − S)(−1) ∗ SIGN(−1). (12)
The coefficients ρ− and ρ+ estimate the autocorrelation coefficients given the negative and
positive forward premium, respectively. Figure 8 and Table 9 provides the regression results.
Two observations stand out. First, the autocorrelation coefficient estimates given positive
forward premiums ρ+ are significantly positive in almost all of the cases, while the coefficient
estimates given negative premiums ρ− are significant in far fewer cases. Out of the total 72
cases, the ρ+ estimates are significant in 67 cases (89%), all of which are positive, while the
ρ− estimates are significant in 43 cases (60%), 40 (3) of which are positive (negative). In
addition, the ρ+ estimates are positive all the 72 cases (100%) and the ρ− estimates are so in
only 59 cases (82%). Second, the size of the coefficients ρ+ is higher than that of ρ−. The
average of ρ+ estimates is 0.296, 0.348, 0.304, and 0.236 in the total 72-stock group and low-,
medium- and high-turnover subgroups, respectively, whereas the corresponding numbers for
the average of ρ− estimates are around half, i.e. 0.167, 0.241, 0.115, and 0.144, respectively.
The significance test for the difference of ρ+ and ρ− shows that (ρ+−ρ−) is positive in 50 (70%),
14 (58%),17 (71%), and 19 (79%) cases in the total 72-stock group and the low-, medium-, and
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Figure 8: Autocorrelation per Sign
F
′ − S = ρ0 + ρ−(F ′ − S)(−1) ∗ (1− SIGN(−1)) + ρ+(F ′ − S)(−1) ∗ SIGN(−1).
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Key: The upper left figure reports the estimates of the autocorrelation of forward premiums given the negative
premiums in the previous day, i.e. ρ−; the upper right is for negative premiums, i.e. ρ−; and the bottom left
is for the difference of the rho, i.e. (ρ+ − ρ−).
high-turnover subgroups, of which 10, 4, 5, and 1 cases are significantly so, respectively. In all
the 22 cases with negative estimates for (ρ+ − ρ−), only 2 cases are significant.
The general picture, then, is that positive price discrepancies are significantly more fre-
quent, and on average half as large. In addition, positive premiums tend to persist for more
than the negative ones, which makes it unlikely that they are the result of random imbalances
between the order books. All this fits in with the view that the marginal traders in the forward
market are typically speculative or informed purchases facing a cash-constraint, while liquidity
traders deal spot.
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Table 9: Autocorrelation per Sign
F
′ − S = ρ0 + ρ−(F ′ − S)(−1) ∗ (1− SIGN(−1)) + ρ+(F ′ − S)(−1) ∗ SIGN(−1)
ρ−
mean median n>0 sgnf>0 n<0 sgnf<0
All 0.167 0.193 59 40 13 3
Low turnover 0.241 0.309 19 15 5 1
Medium 0.115 0.174 18 12 6 2
High 0.144 0.160 22 13 2 0
ρ+
All 0.296 0.285 72 64 0 0
Low turnover 0.348 0.360 24 22 0 0
Medium 0.304 0.275 24 21 0 0
High 0.236 0.229 24 21 0 0
(ρ+ − ρ−)
All 0.129 0.080 50 10 22 2
Low turnover 0.107 0.031 14 4 10 1
Medium 0.189 0.120 17 5 7 1
High 0.092 0.071 19 1 5 0
Key: This table reports the regression result for the forward premium autocorrelation per sign. Newey-West
standard error is used for the test statistics.
4 Conclusions
Buying forward, in Brussels, offered easy leverage; so if raising funds for a cash trade is costly,
the convenience of financing might justify a positive forward premium. Shorting stocks was
equally easy, though, if one sold forward; so if shorting in the cash market is costly, this may
justify abnormally low forward prices. We study which situation seems to be dominant. A
close look at the price discrepancies reveals that shorting difficulties in the spot market are not
the dominant issue, as opposed to borrowing restrictions or other problems with quickly raising
liquidities. We find that for virtually all stocks (i) the probability of positive forward premium
is higher than that of negative premium; (ii) the mean of positive premiums is higher than
that of negative premiums in absolute terms; and (iii) autocorrelation of forward premiums
given positive premiums is significantly positive and around two times larger than that of the
negative premiums. This pattern is consistent with a cash-is-king story, steering buyers to the
levered forward market and sellers to the spot tier, rather than with problems in shorting stocks
in the cash market. Thus, contrary to what many academics may have expected, getting money
loans seems to be a more frequent and more pressing consideration than asset borrowing.
A broader conclusion is that the two prices are not just duplicating each other; they are
to some extent different. A layman may then raise the question which of the two is wrong
and which is right. We know that forward prices are often too high relative to spot values,
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but this does not necessarily tell us whether the former are overvalued or, instead, the latter
undervalued. Answers in economics are rarely all black versus white, so the more academic
question probably is which tends to be faster in reacting, which is typically leading or following,
which is more noisy, or less biased, etcetera. These are the topics of the next two chapters.
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Appendix: independence tests in the aggregate autocorrelation
estimates
Table 10: Preparing for Panel Estimation: Independence Tests for Slopes
slope t-stat prob
All -1.80 -2.63 0.0104
Low turnover 2.96 0.10 0.9199
Medium 12.35 1.90 0.0707
High -0.37 -0.40 0.6943
Key: In this test, we regress ρ1 of each stock on its turnover. ρ1 estimates the scaled autocovariance of forward
premiums. To be able to estimate the mean rho via panel regressions with a common slope we need to test that
individual stocks’ rhos are deviating randomly from a general mean. Here we test whether there is a relation
with turnover, first in the all-stock sample and then in the three subsamples of stocks assembled on the basis
of average daily turnover.
Spot-Forward Price Gaps: the Value of Convenience in the Brussels SE 27
References
Brunnermeier, M. K., and L. H. Pedersen. 2009. Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity,
Review of Financial Studies 22: 2201-2238.
Bui, T. N. T., Sercu P., 2010a, More Friction, Less Noise? Relative Efficiency in a Two-Tier
Stock Exchange, FETEW Research Report AFI 0723, K.U.Leuven, 42 pp.
Bui, T. N. T., Sercu P., 2010b, Trading Systems Efficiency and Noise: Price-discovery Dynam-
ics in the Two-Tier Brussels Exchange, FETEW Research Report AFI 0722, K.U.Leuven,
36 pp.
Chordia, T., R. Roll, and A. Subrahmanyam. 2000. Commonality in Liquidity. Journal of
Financial Economics 56:3-28.
Comerton-Forde, C., T. Hendershott, C. M. Jones, P. C. Moulton, and M. S. Seasholes.
2008. Time Variation in Liquidity: The Role of Market Maker Inventories and Revenues.
Working Paper, Columbia University.
Condoyanni, L. O’Hanlon, J,. and Ward, C.W.R. (1987), Day-of-the-week effect on stock
returns: International Evidence, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 14, 158-
174.
Coughenour, J. F., and M. M. Saad. 2004. Common Market Makers and Commonality in
Liquidity. Journal of Financial Economics 73:37-69.
Crouhy, M., Galai, D., and Keita, B. (1990), The settlement day effect in the French Bourse,
Mimeo, Hec-Isa, France; presented at the 1991 AFFI Conference, Louvain-la-Neuve,
Belgium, July 1991.
French, K. (1980), Stock returns and the weekend effect, Journal of Financial Economics 8,
55-70.
Grossman, S. J., and J.-L. Vila. 1992. Optimal Dynamic Trading with Leverage Constraints.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 27:151-68.
Gruenbichler, J. (1991), Settlement Effects in the Vienna Stock Exchange; paper presented
in the E.I.A.S.M. Workshop on Market Microstructure, Brussels, April 1991. Edition,
Macmillan, 1986, 616-25
Spot-Forward Price Gaps: the Value of Convenience in the Brussels SE 28
Hasbrouck, J., and D. Seppi. 2001. Common Factors in Prices, Order Flows, and Liquidity.
Journal of Financial Economics 59:383-411.
Jaffe, J., and Westerfield, R. (1985), The weekend effect in common stock returns: the inter-
national evidence, Journal of Finance 40, 433-454
Lakonishok, J., and Levi, M. (1982), Weekend effects and stock returns: a note, Journal of
Finance 37, 883-889
Liu, J., and F. A. Longstaff. 2004. Losing Money on Arbitrages: Optimal Dynamic Portfolio
Choice in Markets with Arbitrage Opportunities. Review of Financial Studies 17:611-41.
MacKinley, A.C. and Ramaswamy, K. (1988), Index-futures arbitrage and the behavior of
stock index futures prices, Review of Financial Studies 1(2), 137-158.
McFarland, J.W., Pettit, R.R., and Sung, S.M. (1982), The distribution of foreign exchange
price changes: trading day effects and risk measurement, Journal of Finance 37, 693-715.
Rogalski, R. (1984), New findings regarding day of the week effects over trading and non-
trading periods, Journal of Finance 39, 1603-1614
Solnik, B. (1990), The Distribution of Daily Stock Returns and Settlement Procedures: The
Paris Bourse, Journal of Finance, 45(5), 1601-1609
